Includes index.

"This book gives a detailed description and analysis of the events leading up to the explosion and fire at BP's Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010. The authors provide a comprehensive, fair account of what happened and why, and what could be done to minimize the risk of future business and engineering disasters. Boebert and Blossom question the disaggregated business model for companies that undertake risky, complicated engineering projects in difficult and dangerous environments. They argue that a systems approach, with hands-on attention from top management, is crucial. Writing for the general intelligent reader, the authors provide a clear description of the technicalities of the rig, how it was supposed to work, and how it failed"-- Provided by publisher.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Foreword / by Peter G. Neumann -- Introduction -- Controlling Macondo -- From rig to well -- Weighing Macondo's risks -- The struggle with Macondo -- Planning the production tail -- The production casing plan -- The cementing plan -- The test and displacement plan -- A reconstructed plan -- The systems of the Horizon -- Up to the edge -- The final day -- Going over -- The lessons of Macondo -- Afterword: Evidence, reports, and conventional wisdom -- Appendix: Technical notes.

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